DEPLOYMENT of NMD announced

“Why not concentrate on further research so that the system WORKS? That's my question.

On the other hand, this statement makes perfect sense. Boost phase missile defense works. To date, theater defense does not.”

“Lets hope MND doesn’t become our Maginot Line.”

“You have to be fairly close or 'get the jump on them' to hit them in the boost phase. I guess that's where the 'preemption' comes in... let's hit them before they have a chance to launch. Hell, let's hit them before they deploy... or even develop! LOL

I'm willing to bet that they won't do us the favor of attaching radar reflectors or GPS transmitters to their birds.”

“I long for the Good Ol' Days...

At least the $900 toilet seats didn't give us a false sense of security, <VBG>”

“$900 toilet seats........how about a good old $h!tjack?”

“From Federation of American Scientists

Boost-Phase Intercept -- Not If, But When

Richard L. Garwin, July 2000

http://www.fas.org/rlg/rlg0710NMD_TEXT.htm

[snip]

the mid-course U.S. NMD system under development today would
fail catastrophically if North Korea launched a few primitive intercontinental ballistic missiles fitted with
penetration aids that are far easier to make than the ICBMs
themselves.
In contrast, no biological warfare or nuclear payload
on a "rogue nation" ICBM -- the stated reason for building
the NMD system -- will reach the United States if the
missile is intercepted before it gets to full speed, while
its rocket engine is still firing. Intercepting a North
Korean ICBM could be achieved through use of existing
satellites and the deployment of large interceptors based as
much as 1,000 kilometers from North Korea -- on U.S.
military cargo ships or on Russian territory.

[snip]

Since 1991, I have warned that the proposed midcourse,
hit-to-kill defensive concepts -- first the Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system and later
the NMD system -- would not counter the anthrax threat even
of early ICBMs, because any state capable of building ICBMs
could far more readily outfit them with anthrax bomblets
released on ascent--increasing its effectiveness over a
larger, single anthrax warhead. Similarly, a nuclear warhead
from these states would penetrate the defense by the use of
multiple empty balloons, together with an "anti-simulation"
balloon around the real warhead.

[snip]

A single ICBM that distributes 50 or 100 anthrax-filled
bomblets as soon as it gets up to speed will ensure that few
or none of them can be intercepted by the proposed NMD
system. A missile with a nuclear warhead would launch dozens
of inflated, aluminized mylar balloons, with the warhead
itself inside a similar balloon; neither the radars nor the
infrared sensors on a U.S. interceptor could distinguish one
balloon from another. And a cooled shroud would render the
warhead invisible to a homing kill vehicle, which could
therefore not collide with it.
In a June 20 press conference, Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Jacques
Gansler acknowledged that the United States would have to
launch interceptors at every multiple warhead or bomblet.
Some excuse the NMD system, because it is "not designed to
defend against bomblets." Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization and Office of the Secretary of Defense
officials characterize those who say the NMD system as
incapable of dealing with countermeasures as "naãve" and
"unaware" of intelligence information on the threat, or of
the tools and technologies available to the NMD program to
counter these penetration aids. Neither of these adjectives
fits me; the Rumsfeld Commission, by law and in fact, had
access to all intelligence information available to the U.S.
government.

[snip]

A single ICBM that distributes 50 or 100 anthrax-filled
bomblets as soon as it gets up to speed will ensure that few
or none of them can be intercepted by the proposed NMD
system. A missile with a nuclear warhead would launch dozens
of inflated, aluminized mylar balloons, with the warhead
itself inside a similar balloon; neither the radars nor the
infrared sensors on a U.S. interceptor could distinguish one
balloon from another. And a cooled shroud would render the
warhead invisible to a homing kill vehicle, which could
therefore not collide with it.
In a June 20 press conference, Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Jacques
Gansler acknowledged that the United States would have to
launch interceptors at every multiple warhead or bomblet.
Some excuse the NMD system, because it is "not designed to
defend against bomblets." Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization and Office of the Secretary of Defense
officials characterize those who say the NMD system as
incapable of dealing with countermeasures as "naãve" and
"unaware" of intelligence information on the threat, or of
the tools and technologies available to the NMD program to
counter these penetration aids. Neither of these adjectives
fits me; the Rumsfeld Commission, by law and in fact, had
access to all intelligence information available to the U.S.
government.

[snip]”

“sorry about the formatting.

:(”

“From Federation of American Scientists

http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/bpi.htm

[snip]

The UAV-Based Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) program covers Israeli Cooperative BPI, and US BPI. Israeli Cooperative BPI is a joint U.S./Government of Israel (GOI) BPI program which involves future development and refinement (risk mitigation) of the Israeli Boost Phases Intercept System (IBIS) concept which is planned to destroy tactical ballistic missiles in the boost phase of flight, before engine cutoff, preferably while in enemy territory. This project is based on the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) armed with on-board interceptors to provide the means of destroying enemy missiles in their boosting phase of flight. The first task of this two part project will provide risk mitigation in the development of the GOI's UAV BPI. This program is a 'hedge' for the ABL program - conducting such cooperative activities allows both countries to mitigate the risk of developing UAV-based BPI systems individually. The GOI will take the lead on risk mitigation of the interceptor while the U.S. will lead for the Infrared Search and Track (IRST) sensor activities in other system elements, such as BMC4I and system integration will be shared. The US and GOI will share costs.
The U.S. UAV-based BPI system concept develops the system requirements for the total concept, kinetic energy interceptors, UAVs, search and track sensors, Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (BMC4I), and the concept of operations (CONOPS) based on readily available U.S. technologies.

[snip]”

“much more can be found by searching for "boost phase intercept" on Google”

“Research, Developement, Test and Evaluation is cyclical in nature. Moving forward at this pace is the least expensive of many options. The initial plans were for 125 missiles in the Ground when fully deployed at Ft Greely, and the addition of another Launch Site with more in Greenland.

20 total in the ground with another 20+-on Navy ships, allows for a lot of RDT&E while providing a minimal defense capability....Korea is a threat, so a defense in correlation to the threat is called for, while we continue to improve the design...

Think of this as sword play...neither side has devloped the gun yet, and are attacking or defending with rudimentary weaponry.”

“providing a minimal defense capability

This is the operative phrase. Minimal indeed! Counter-measures are low tech and easy to deploy - and these would render mid-term NMD useless. The whole world knows this - it's no secret.

However, BPI MD has been shown to be highly successful (judging from Israeli tests), and it's based on tried and true existing technologies.

We should be spending major $$$ on DEPLOYING BPI instead of the costly, obviously unreliable, easily foiled NMD.

This way we'd have true ICBM and theater BM defense in a few years, and plenty more time to research and improve on NMD.”

“Exactly. Basing interceptors in the continental US is folly. They would have to be deployed much closer to the launch sites.

And they would still have to differentiate targets from decoys... separate the wheat from the chaff, so to speak.

I still wonder, though... have the North Koreans developed a device more compact than 'Fat Man' class? (that WAS a monster at over 5 tons)

Their Chem and Bio programs don't seem to have generated much press. I wonder what progress they might have made on those fronts, the throw-weights not being so prohibitive.”

“The problem is, no one knows. Our intelligence on NK is very scant.”

“I'm afraid this may be a case of:

"Don't just stand there! DO Something!"


I think the original cost estimates I saw must have been based on deploying the 125 missiles. That was a TON o' money!”

“There were some interesting presentations on C-SPAN2 just now: Keith Payne and Peter Franklin for the American Foreign Policy Council at one of the Senate Office Buildings...

The switch from Threat-based assessment to Capabilities-based...

20 ground-based mid-course interceptors... Ft. Greely AK... 20 sea-based mid-course interceptors... testing on the USS Lake Erie AEGIS cruiser with SM-3s...

Patriot PAC-3s (no warheads - kinetic energy only)... like 350 of those, eventually...

Upgrades to detection systems... Thule, Greenland and old DEWline installations possible as well as space-based systems...

They didn't have much to say regarding boost-phase. I understand that the airborne laser is still under development. They mentioned that only in passing.”