The case against Iraq

“Gee, I wonder if they'll mention this on National Review Online?”

“Do you suppose God and Allah have arguments all the time? Buddha seems to stay pretty much out of it these days, but I keep thinking that God and Allah must be having fights all the damn time.”

“George W. Bush is God.”

“Don't know about a morality argument but getting rid of Saddam is the right thing to do, just hope we can actually finish and put his head on a pike at the gates of Baghdad.”

“That's the only reason left. All the others went <poof>.”

“jihad bush....



JIIIIHaaaAAAAAAAAAAAAAHAD BUSSSSSSSHHA!”

“Dumb catch-phrase.


duuuuumb Caaaaatch-Phraaaase.”

“it's a battleplan, not a catchphrase......in fact, it's pretty much all ya'll got...


dis bush and 20 virgins await you...”

“I see you're still full of insight and original ideas.”

“acting like i'm stupid is no new idea...


JIHAD BUSH! BUSH IS THE INFIDEL! BUSH IS THE REAL TERRORIST!

FIGHT! FIGHT THE REAL POWER!”

“Interesting read: THE PENTAGON’S
NEW MAP by THOMAS P.M. BARNETT, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

He explains why the "Gap" countries outside of globalization's reach are a threat to the "Core" countries: North America, much of South America, the European Union, Putin’s Russia, Japan and Asia’s emerging economies (most notably China and India), Australia and New Zealand, and South Africa.”

“Fascinating article. I agree with him on many points, but the term globalization seems to be the wrong term to use for the concept of not supporting dictatorial governments and encouraging human rights.

Also, he ignores the rule of international law altogether, except in the forms of trade laws of the WTO. In what manner does he expect the US to maintain its dominant position in the face of "globalization" other than militarily?

He never mentions the UN's role in this new world order, nor, it would seem, does he believe that an authority other than the US's military might is necessary outside of trade laws.

Still, there's a lot of food for thought in that.”

“This HAS to be the most substantive article posted here in the last few months, and everyone is ignoring it. Typical!”

“I've seen this stuff before and have a a number of major problems with this. Two of them are:

1) It's very hard to see how invading countries and regions gives them more security.

2) It ignores the possibility that the economic system in the "core" contributes to the economic disparities which underly the tensions he describes.

3) Note that North Korea - which we continued to contain is on the list of trouble spots and North and South Vietnam (where we backed off 30 years ago) isn't. Also, notice that liberalization is in the air in Iran - but that, according to the author, the resurgence of fundamentalism may be a consequence of our invasion of Iraq. Perhaps self-determination, peace, and freedom from the most corrosive and exploitative multinationals can, at least sometimes, be a progressive force.”

“I hope he is right - that the age of nation on nation warfare is nearing an end. It seems it should be easier to handle “Super Empowered Individuals”, even if it means adopting a new military paradigm. Raising the standard of living worldwide would greatly reduce the threat. I think he is quite correct though that economic development won’t happen without security, which is the thrust of his article. I wonder if there are enough resources on Earth to do that to a satisfactory level.

Phaedrus - You'd probably enjoy this book.”

“global holy war. WWIII. like a theif in the night it has begun. get your tickets here. choose sides and get in line. it may last a thousand years. wars and rumors of wars. famine, pestulance, locusts, "friends" reruns.....it's all over!”

“2) It ignores the possibility that the economic system in the "core" contributes to the economic disparities which underly the tensions he describes.


This is a good point, and one I hadn't adequately considered. I do believe, though, that with technology comes adequate living conditions for the poor, as long as there is sufficient regulation of big business' economic interests.

Perhaps self-determination, peace, and freedom from the most corrosive and exploitative multinationals can, at least sometimes, be a progressive force.

Absolutely! And economic engagement seems to be bringing some countries around (i.e. China, Russia).

The real question for me, is how we handle dictatorships and more oppressive regimes that are somewhat immune to the carrot approach. Is the US the only country allowed to use the stick, or is it even our place to do so? What role does international rule of law play in the new paradigm?

Our current administration seems to be of the opinion that we can figure all that out later, but for now we MUST force the issue.”

“BTW, thanks for the book recommendation, Violin. Looks like a real hoot...”

“"I do believe, though, that with technology comes adequate living conditions for the poor, as long as there is sufficient regulation of big business' economic interests."
Phaedrus

I hope this is true. There are a few key problems:
1) The nations that are economically comfortable are consuming resources at a per capita rate that is very far above the rate that would be sustainable sustainable if shared world-wide. The resulting pollution would be devastating, as will be the competition for resources (unless new resources could be found/developed). Something will have to be done about conservation, distribution of resources, and pollution if the gap is to shrink without a major collapse in living standards in the first world.

2) Market forces seem to move towards a concentration of wealth and power, not a balancing.

3) "Supply and demand" does not equal "supply and need." If human needs have no dollars behind them, they make no demand in the market place. A great example of this was a medication (I forget the details right now) which stopped a fatal disease in poor Africans - which ceased production due to lack of demand (read lack of money), but which was manufactured again when it solved some cosmetic problem for women in western countries.”

“Last in my reactions to this is gap notion is suspicion: when the solution for the worlds ills is incorporation into the empire - one has to worry about self-serving distortion on the parts of the agents of empire who prescrribe it.”

“Maybe,our mad cow friends will cut the population back enough to empty out the Vegas hotels.”

“According to this story, we could wind up paying for reconstruction twice - once for contacts to Halliburton et al. and again (through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) if a new Iraqi government re-nationalizes piratized industries. Three times if you include the cost of providing security.

This Empire stuff gets expensive!”

“Profit - 100% private
Risk - 100% public”

“

For Vietnam Vet Anthony Zinni, Another War on Shaky Territory
by Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post

Anthony C. Zinni's opposition to U.S. policy on Iraq began on the monsoon-ridden afternoon of Nov. 3, 1970. He was lying on a Vietnamese mountainside west of Da Nang, three rounds from an AK-47 assault rifle in his side and back. He could feel his lifeblood seeping into the ground as he slipped in and out of consciousness.

He had plenty of time to think in the following months while recuperating in a military hospital in Hawaii. Among other things, he promised himself that, "If I'm ever in a position to say what I think is right, I will. ... I don't care what happens to my career."

That time has arrived.

Over the past year, the retired Marine Corps general has become one of the most prominent opponents of Bush administration policy on Iraq, which he now fears is drifting toward disaster.

It is one of the more unusual political journeys to come out of the American experience with Iraq. Zinni still talks like an old-school Marine — a big-shouldered, weight-lifting, working-class Philadelphian whose father emigrated from Italy's Abruzzi region, and who is fond of quoting the wisdom of his fictitious "Uncle Guido, the plumber." Yet he finds himself in the unaccustomed role of rallying the antiwar camp, attacking the policies of the president and commander in chief whom he had endorsed in the 2000 election.

"Iraq is in serious danger of coming apart because of lack of planning, underestimating the task and buying into a flawed strategy," he says. "The longer we stubbornly resist admitting the mistakes and not altering our approach, the harder it will be to pull this chestnut out of the fire."

Three years ago, Zinni completed a tour as chief of the Central Command, the U.S. military headquarters for the Middle East, during which he oversaw enforcement of the two "no-fly" zones in Iraq and also conducted four days of punishing airstrikes against that country in 1998. He even served briefly as a special envoy to the Middle East, mainly as a favor to his old friend and comrade Secretary of State Colin L. Powell.

Zinni long has worried that there are worse outcomes possible in Iraq than having Saddam Hussein in power — such as eliminating him in such a way that Iraq will become a new haven for terrorism in the Middle East.

"I think a weakened, fragmented, chaotic Iraq, which could happen if this isn't done carefully, is more dangerous in the long run than a contained Saddam is now," he told reporters in 1998. "I don't think these questions have been thought through or answered." It was a warning for which Iraq hawks such as Paul D. Wolfowitz, then an academic and now the No. 2 official at the Pentagon, attacked him in print at the time.

Now, five years later, Zinni fears it is an outcome toward which U.S.-occupied Iraq may be drifting. Nor does he think the capture of Hussein is likely to make much difference, beyond boosting U.S. troop morale and providing closure for his victims. "Since we've failed thus far to capitalize" on opportunities in Iraq, he says, "I don't have confidence we will do it now. I believe the only way it will work now is for the Iraqis themselves to somehow take charge and turn things around. Our policy, strategy, tactics, et cetera, are still screwed up."

'Where's the Threat?'

Anthony Zinni's passage from obedient general to outspoken opponent began in earnest in the unlikeliest of locations, the national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. He was there in Nashville in August 2002 to receive the group's Dwight D. Eisenhower Distinguished Service Award, recognition for his 35 years in the Marine Corps.

Vice President Cheney was also there, delivering a speech on foreign policy. Sitting on the stage behind the vice president, Zinni grew increasingly puzzled. He had endorsed Bush and Cheney two years earlier, just after he retired from his last military post, as chief of the U.S. Central Command, which oversees operations in Iraq.

"I think he ran on a moderate ticket, and that's my leaning — I'm kind of a Lugar-Hagel-Powell guy," he says, listing three Republicans associated with centrist foreign policy positions.

He was alarmed that day to hear Cheney make the argument for attacking Iraq on grounds that Zinni found questionable at best:

"Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction," Cheney said. "There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us."

Cheney's certitude bewildered Zinni. As chief of the Central Command, Zinni had been immersed in U.S. intelligence about Iraq. He was all too familiar with the intelligence analysts' doubts about Iraq's programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction, or WMD. "In my time at Centcom, I watched the intelligence, and never — not once — did it say, 'He has WMD.' "

Though retired for nearly two years, Zinni says, he remained current on the intelligence through his consulting with the CIA and the military. "I did consulting work for the agency, right up to the beginning of the war. I never saw anything. I'd say to analysts, 'Where's the threat?' " Their response, he recalls, was, "Silence."

Zinni's concern deepened as Cheney pressed on that day at the Opryland Hotel. "Time is not on our side," the vice president said. "The risks of inaction are far greater than the risks of action."

Zinni's conclusion as he slowly walked off the stage that day was that the Bush administration was determined to go to war. A moment later, he had another, equally chilling thought: "These guys don't understand what they are getting into."

Unheeded Advice

This retired Marine commander is hardly a late-life convert to pacifism. "I'm not saying there aren't parts of the world that don't need their ass kicked," he says, sitting in a hotel lobby in Pentagon City, wearing an open-necked blue shirt. Even at the age of 60, he remains an avid weight-lifter and is still a solid, square-faced slab of a man. "Afghanistan was the right thing to do," he adds, referring to the U.S. invasion there in 2001 to oust the Taliban regime and its allies in the al Qaeda terrorist organization.

But he didn't see any need to invade Iraq. He didn't think Hussein was much of a worry anymore. "He was contained," he says. "It was a pain in the ass, but he was contained. He had a deteriorated military. He wasn't a threat to the region."

But didn't his old friend Colin Powell also describe Hussein as a threat? Zinni dismisses that. "He's trying to be the good soldier, and I respect him for that." Zinni no longer does any work for the State Department.

Zinni's concern deepened at a Senate hearing in February, just six weeks before the war began. As he awaited his turn to testify, he listened to Pentagon and State Department officials talk vaguely about the "uncertainties" of a postwar Iraq. He began to think they were doing the wrong thing the wrong way. "I was listening to the panel, and I realized, 'These guys don't have a clue.' "

That wasn't a casual judgment. Zinni had started thinking about how the United States might handle Iraq if Hussein's government collapsed after Operation Desert Fox, the four days of airstrikes that he oversaw in December 1998, in which he targeted presidential palaces, Baath Party headquarters, intelligence facilities, military command posts and barracks, and factories that might build missiles that could deliver weapons of mass destruction.

In the wake of those attacks on about 100 major targets, intelligence reports came in that Hussein's government had been shaken by the short campaign. "After the strike, we heard from countries with diplomatic missions in there [Baghdad] that the regime was paralyzed, and that there was a kind of defiance in the streets," he recalls.

So early in 1999 he ordered that plans be devised for the possibility of the U.S. military having to occupy Iraq. Under the code name "Desert Crossing," the resulting document called for a nationwide civilian occupation authority, with offices in each of Iraq's 18 provinces. That plan contrasts sharply, he notes, with the reality of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S. occupation power, which for months this year had almost no presence outside Baghdad — an absence that some Army generals say has increased their burden in Iraq.

Listening to the administration officials testify that day, Zinni began to suspect that his careful plans had been disregarded. Concerned, he later called a general at Central Command's headquarters in Tampa and asked, "Are you guys looking at Desert Crossing?" The answer, he recalls, was, "What's that?"

The more he listened to Wolfowitz and other administration officials talk about Iraq, the more Zinni became convinced that interventionist "neoconservative" ideologues were plunging the nation into a war in a part of the world they didn't understand. "The more I saw, the more I thought that this was the product of the neocons who didn't understand the region and were going to create havoc there. These were dilettantes from Washington think tanks who never had an idea that worked on the ground."

And the more he dwelled on this, the more he began to believe that U.S. soldiers would wind up paying for the mistakes of Washington policymakers. And that took him back to that bloody day in the sodden Que Son mountains in Vietnam.

A Familiar Chill

Even now, decades later, Vietnam remains a painful subject for him. "I only went to the Wall once, and it was very difficult," he says, talking about his sole visit to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the Mall. "I was walking down past the names of my men," he recalls. "My buddies, my troops — just walking down that Wall was hard, and I couldn't go back."

Now he feels his nation — and a new generation of his soldiers — have been led down a similar path.

"Obviously there are differences" between Vietnam and Iraq, he says. "Every situation is unique." But in his bones, he feels the same chill. "It feels the same. I hear the same things — about [administration charges about] not telling the good news, about cooking up a rationale for getting into the war." He sees both conflicts as beginning with deception by the U.S. government, drawing a parallel between how the Johnson administration handled the beginning of the Vietnam War and how the Bush administration touted the threat presented by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. "I think the American people were conned into this," he says. Referring to the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which the Johnson administration claimed that U.S. Navy ships had been subjected to an unprovoked attack by North Vietnam, he says, "The Gulf of Tonkin and the case for WMD and terrorism is synonymous in my mind."

Likewise, he says, the goal of transforming the Middle East by imposing democracy by force reminds him of the "domino theory" in the 1960s that the United States had to win in Vietnam to prevent the rest of Southeast Asia from falling into communist hands.

And that brings him back to Wolfowitz and his neoconservative allies as the root of the problem. "I don't know where the neocons came from - - that wasn't the platform they ran on," he says. "Somehow, the neocons captured the president. They captured the vice president."

He is especially irked that, as he sees it, no senior officials have taken responsibility for their incorrect assessment of the threat posed by Iraq. "What I don't understand is that the bill of goods the neocons sold him has been proven false, yet heads haven't rolled," he says. "Where is the accountability? I think some fairly senior people at the Pentagon ought to go." Who? "That's up to the president."

Zinni has picked his shots carefully — a speech here, a "Nightline" segment or interview there. "My contemporaries, our feelings and sensitivities were forged on the battlefields of Vietnam, where we heard the garbage and the lies, and we saw the sacrifice," he said at a talk to hundreds of Marine and Navy officers and others at a Crystal City hotel ballroom in September. "I ask you, is it happening again?" The speech, part of a forum sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute and the Marine Corps Association, received prolonged applause, with many officers standing.

Zinni says that he hasn't received a single negative response from military people about the stance he has taken. "I was surprised by the number of uniformed guys, all ranks, who said, 'You're speaking for us. Keep on keeping on.' "

Even home in Williamsburg, he has been surprised at the reaction. "I mean, I live in a very conservative Republican community, and people were saying, 'You're right.' "

But Zinni vows that he has learned a lesson. Reminded that he endorsed Bush in 2000, he says, "I'm not going to do anything political again — ever. I made that mistake one time."”

“(CBS/AP) Almost a year after he made the United States' case for war to the world, Secretary of State Colin Powell said he is not sure he would have supported the invasion of Iraq if he knew Iraq had no weapons stockpiles.

Powell indicated the existence of actual weapons was crucial to the case for war. No weapons stockpiles have been found to date.

Asked by The Washington Post if he would have backed the war, Powell said: "I don't know, because it was the stockpile that presented the final little piece that made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and to the world."

The "absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus; it changes the answer you get," he told the newspaper.”

“(CBS/AP) Intelligence analysts did not deem Iraq an "imminent threat" before the United States invaded last year, the head of the CIA said Thursday in a speech defending his agency's estimates of Saddam Hussein's military capabilities.”

“POwell was the final "little piece" for me to back it in the beingining, looks like we were both dupped. Too bad feelings back then would not have permitted him resigning. He's a good guy.....too bad his creditibly is ruined beyond repair.”

“That's the way I was also, Laqtis. I was swayed by Colin Powell's "scientific" presentation. However, I did not feel that invasion was called for at that point. Iraq was not a direct threat to the US.”

“WASHINGTON — The public version of the U.S. intelligence community's key prewar assessment of Iraq's illicit arms programs was stripped of dissenting opinions, warnings of insufficient information and doubts about Saddam Hussein's intentions, a review of the document and its once-classified version shows.

What that comparison showed is that while the top-secret version delivered to President Bush, his top lieutenants and Congress was heavily qualified with caveats about some of its most-important conclusions about Iraq's illicit weapons programs, those caveats were omitted from the public version.




Tuesday, February 10, 2004 - Page updated at 12:00 A.M.

2 versions of a report on Iraq's weapons

By Knight Ridder Newspapers


WASHINGTON — Following are excerpts from the public and classified versions of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons capabilities. The first set of quotes is from the classified version of the report; the second set of quotes is from the public version, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," which the CIA released in October 2002.

Unmanned aircraft

Classified version

" ... The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, US Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability."

Public version

"Baghdad's UAVs — especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents — could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland."

WMDs

Classified version

"We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon within this decade. (See INR alternative view at the end of these Key Judgments.)"

Public version




"Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon within this decade."

Classified version

"We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception efforts. ... We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD programs."

Public version

"Iraq hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts."

Nuclear program

Classified version

"The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programs, INR is unwilling to ... project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening."

Public version

" ... most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program."

Biological weapons

Classified version

"We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.

"... Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington with a stronger case for making war.

"Iraq probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the US Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge.

" ... we have no specific intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks against US territory."

Public version

"Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland."

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2001854423_intelside10.html”

“As a result, the public was given a far more definitive assessment of Iraq's plans and capabilities than Bush and other U.S. decision-makers received from their intelligence agencies.


http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2001854422_intel100.html

.”

“

Despite the whitewash, we now know that the Bush administration was warned before the war that its Iraq claims were weak”

“My what a fair and balanced story...haha! Did ya hear the news yesterday Super V? In Gen. Tommy Frank's new book he explains how leading up to the war the king of Syria and the pres of Egypt both told him Saddam had them? Other Islamic nations that hate us were even telling us.”

“Powell's speech, delivered on February 5, 2003, made the case for the war by presenting U.S. intelligence that purported to prove that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Wilkerson says the information in Powell's presentation initially came from a document he described as "sort of a Chinese menu" that was provided by the White House.

"(Powell) came through the door ... and he had in his hands a sheaf of papers, and he said, 'This is what I've got to present at the United Nations according to the White House, and you need to look at it,'" Wilkerson says in the program. "It was anything but an intelligence document. It was, as some people characterized it later, sort of a Chinese menu from which you could pick and choose."

http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/08/19/powell.un/index.html”

“Pal ,another stupid pawn.”

“Anybody familiar with the Downing Street Memo?”

“sheaf of papers=pack of lies”

“"I did not have sex with that woman, Monica Lewinsky"”

“I'll take a BJ over thousands killed unnecessarily any day.”

“Over three thousand amputees..........”

“I'm not defending anyone here folks. I was just simply illustrating that it's not the first time someone in the White House lied about something.”

“True enough...”

“In '64 the Johnson administration and the Congress sold the people a lie called "The Gulf Of Tonkin Resolution" to deepen invovlement in Southeast Asia.”

“Very true statement Marko.”

“Programming Note: " 'Dead Wrong' -- Inside an Intelligence Meltdown" airs Sunday at 8 p.m. and 11 p.m. ET on CNN.


(CNN) -- A former top aide to Colin Powell says his involvement in the former secretary of state's presentation to the United Nations on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was "the lowest point" in his life.

"I wish I had not been involved in it," says Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, a longtime Powell adviser who served as his chief of staff from 2002 through 2005. "I look back on it, and I still say it was the lowest point in my life."

Wilkerson is one of several insiders interviewed for the CNN Presents documentary "Dead Wrong -- Inside an Intelligence Meltdown." The program, which airs Sunday at 8 p.m. and 11 p.m. ET, pieces together the events leading up to the mistaken WMD intelligence that was presented to the public. A presidential commission that investigated the pre-war WMD intelligence found much of it to be "dead wrong."

http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/08/19/powell.un/index.html”

“BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- Saddam Hussein's attorneys will ask an Iraqi tribunal Monday for permission to add former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark to the courtroom defense team.”

“Libbies have already 'convicted' Rove and any other Bushie, but bend over backwards to help Saddam Hussein.

Go figure.”

“LOL! All Libbies want for Rove and his kind is a fair trial.”

“Rove has not even commited a crime and you want to put him on trial? Wow you guys are dangerous.”

“What happens if Hussein is ruled not guilty?

What happens to Hussein if he is found guilty and we pull out? Do we take him with us?

The big mistake was made by Bush senior. He should not have personalized the conflict with Hussein. We should have waited a few years and normalized relations like with Qaddafi.”

“pedx hasn't read a single word of the Vile Man, has he? LOL”