Al Qaeda Endorse Bush (really)

“Allen Ludden: "The Password is 'deer'...."

Contestant: "doe"

Nipsey Russell: "knob"”

“lmao @ Tilt!”

“The American Conservative

October 25, 2004 issue-------------------------------------------------------

The War Bin Laden Wanted

How the U.S. played into the terrorist's plan
By Paul W. Schroeder

George W. Bush's re-election campaign rests on three claims, distinct but
always run together: that the United States is at war against terror, that
it is winning the war, and that it can ultimately achieve victory but only
under his leadership.

The second and third propositions are hotly debated. Critics of Bush contend
that the U.S. is losing the struggle against terror on the most important
fronts and that only new leadership can bring victory, but except for a few
radicals, no one denies that the struggle against international terrorism in
general and groups like al-Qaeda in particular constitutes a real war. The
question comes up in the campaign only when Republicans such as Vice
President Cheney charge that Democrats view terrorists as mere criminals and
do not recognize that the country is at war. The charge, though false-no
Democratic leader would commit political suicide by even hinting this-is
effective politically.

Some experts on international law and foreign policy object to calling the
struggle against terrorism a war, pointing for example to the legal problem
of whether under international law a state can declare war on a non-state
movement and claim the rights of war, or arguing that terrorism constitutes
a tactic and that no one declares war against a tactic. Both arguments
indicate the sloppy thinking that pervades the rhetoric of the War on
Terror. The first point, moreover, has important practical consequences for
such questions as the treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay,
and elsewhere, and for our relations with allies, other states, and the UN.
Yet these kinds of arguments seem too academic to matter. The general public
can hardly understand them, much less let them influence their votes.

Other reasons, however-different, more powerful, highly practical, and
astonishingly overlooked-argue against conceiving of the struggle as a war
and, more important still, waging it as such. The reasons and the logic
behind them are somewhat complicated, but the overall conclusion is simple:
by conceiving of the struggle against international terrorism as a war,
loudly proclaiming it as such, and waging it as one, we have given our
enemies the war they wanted and aimed to provoke but could not get unless
the United States gave it to them.

This conclusion is not about semantics or language but has enormous
implications. It points to fundamentally faulty thinking as one of the
central reasons that America is currently losing the struggle, and it means
that a change in leadership in Washington, though essential, will not by
itself turn the course of events. What is required is a new, different way
of thinking about the struggle against terrorism and from that a different
way of waging it.

Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda repeatedly and publicly declared war on the
United States and waged frequent attacks against its property, territory
(including embassies abroad), and citizens for years before the spectacular
attack on 9/11. This admission would seem to destroy my case at the outset
and end the discussion. If bin Laden and al-Qaeda declared war on the United
States and committed unmistakable acts of war against it, then obviously the
U.S. had no choice but to declare war in reply, just as it had to do so
against Japan after Pearl Harbor.

No, not really. Some other obvious facts also need consideration. First,
states frequently wage real, serious wars of the conventional sort against
other states without declaring war or putting their countries on a war
footing. In the latter 20th century, this practice became the rule rather
than the exception. Korea and Vietnam are only two of many examples. Second,
revolutionary and terrorist organizations and movements have for centuries
declared war on the governments or societies they wished to subvert and
overthrow. Yet even while fighting them ruthlessly, states rarely made
formal declarations of war against such movements. Instead, they treated
these groups as criminals, revolutionaries, rebels, or tools of a hostile
foreign power, not as organizations against which a recognized legitimate
government declares and wages war.

The reasons are obvious. A revolutionary or terrorist movement has much to
gain from getting a real government to declare war upon it. This gives the
movement considerable status, putting it in some sense in the same league
with the government with which it is now recognized as at war. No sensible
government wishes to give such quasi-legitimacy to a movement it is trying
to stamp out. Consider Napoleon's treatment of the insurrection in Spain
from 1808 to 1813. The insurgents had powerful claims to belligerent status
and even legitimacy. They maintained a government in a small corner of
Spain, represented the former legitimate Bourbon government Napoleon had
overthrown, included the regular Spanish army, and were supported and
recognized by a major power, Great Britain. But Napoleon always insisted
they were nothing but brigands, used this designation as justification for
the brutal campaign he waged against them, and acknowledged a state of war
with them only when, defeated in Spain and on other fronts, he decided to
cut his losses, evacuate Spain, and make peace with them and the Bourbon
regime.

Other reasons further explain why legitimate governments have not declared
war on terrorist or revolutionary organizations that waged war against
them-for example, the fact that when one declares war one has to operate
under the prevailing laws of war, and these can be constricting for a
legitimate government, as the United States is currently finding out in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Thus declaring a war on terrorism and
waging it as a genuine war has to be justified as an exception to a powerful
rule, not accepted as the obvious response to a terrorist attack.

Readers may find this an impractical, academic argument and respond, "So
what? This is a unique situation. Our country never faced a threat just like
this before. Besides, what difference does it make what you call a campaign
against terrorism if in fact you intend to wage an all-out fight to
exterminate terrorist organizations with every weapon at your command? In
practical terms, that is war, whatever name you use for it, and it is good
for the American public, the world, and the enemy to face it."

Again, not so fast. The issue is not whether the American public after 9/11
needed squarely to face the fact that the United States had been attacked by
a dangerous enemy and had to fight back. It still needs to understand
this-and does. Neither is the issue whether in fighting back the U.S. had a
right to use military force against that enemy anywhere (though only where)
it was sensible and practical to do so. Those points are not in dispute. The
relevant, practical questions instead are, first, whether it was necessary
to declare war on that enemy in order to confront the attack and fight back
with every useful means, including military force. As just indicated, the
historical and practical answer to that question is no. Second, was a public
declaration of war against terrorism in general needed to prepare
psychologically for a serious campaign against the enemy? The reaction of
the American public and virtually every other government and people to the
9/11 attack and the subsequent American counterattack makes clear that for
this purpose a formal declaration was unnecessary. The support in America
and abroad for a powerful campaign against al-Qaeda was overwhelming.

The only question left is the one central to the argument: did the American
government, by constantly and solemnly declaring the nation at war against
terrorism and repeatedly summoning the rest of the world to join up or else
be ranked among America's enemies actually help or hurt the campaign against
the terrorist enemy?

The natural response might be, "How could the declarations of war possibly
have hurt? Even if they were not strictly necessary, they served to unite
the American people and gird them for possible sacrifices and losses and to
rally the rest of the world behind the American effort. What harm did they
supposedly do?"

It was never in dispute that Osama bin Laden deliberately, repeatedly, and
in the most spectacular way possible provoked a war with the United States.
What should that tell us? Why did he do this? What was he after?

Once again this looks like an intellectual befogging the issue and ignoring
the obvious. Osama bin Laden did this because America is his enemy. He hates
America and its ideals, America stands in the way of his creating the kind
of world he is fanatically determined to bring about, and so he declared war
on America and tried to destroy it and kill as many Americans as possible.
This interpretation is perfectly understandable and defensible from a moral
and emotional standpoint. Unfortunately, it is counterproductive from the
standpoint of rational analysis and policymaking.

Two vital principles in foreign-policy thinking are, first, know the
enemy-this means doing one's best to enter into his thought world and
decision-making processes, to think from his presuppositions and
standpoint-and second, expect a hidden agenda and look for it. Assume that
the enemy's decisions and actions have a purposive rationality behind them,
that he hopes to achieve by them some concrete result that is rational in
terms of his goals and worldview, however fanatical, irrational, or simply
evil his actions may seem.

Apply these two principles to the question here. Take for granted that Osama
bin Laden is an evil fanatic, totally determined to pursue his goals and
wholly unscrupulous in the means he is willing to use to reach them. But
assume also that he is highly intelligent, shrewd, patient, and focused in
his strategy. Supposing this and knowing that he is the leader of a
relatively small, highly secret terrorist organization, strong in devotion
to its cause but weak in both numbers and weapons in comparison to the
resources available to any major state, much less the world's one
superpower, ask yourself: why would he go out of his way to challenge that
superpower with its awesome array of resources and weapons, deliberately
provoking it into declaring war to the death upon him and his organization?
The enormous risks are obvious. What were the potential gains?

Any serious and unemotional consideration of this question makes it apparent
that the answer "He hates America and wants to destroy it" will not do. If
that were his concrete strategy and end, that would make him a fool, which
he is not. Any fairly intelligent person would know that an attack like that
of 9/11, or even ten such attacks, would not suffice to defeat the United
States or make it give up the struggle against terrorism and accept the
unhindered spread of radical revolutionary Islam in the world. Any
intelligent person would instead expect the attack on the American homeland
to have precisely the political, psychological, and military effects it
actually had-to mobilize the government, the American public, and many of
its allies around the globe for an all-out struggle against al-Qaeda and
international terrorism. Anyone with intelligence would also have
anticipated the huge risks to himself and his organization from the
inevitable counterattack-a military campaign by an overwhelmingly superior
foe against his political base and secret camps in Afghanistan, blows to his
cells wherever they could be found, international police, intelligence, and
financial measures against his organization on a vastly increased scale,
heavy pressure on regimes that had secretly supported or tolerated his
activities to crack down on them, the imprisonment or death of anyone in
al-Qaeda's ranks from bottom to top-in short, all the measures that the Bush
administration carried out and has trumpeted as successes in the War on
Terror. Why would bin Laden knowingly risk all this for the sake of an
attack, however spectacular, that he knew would not seriously damage the
United States as a nation?

Two replies frequently offered need to be considered before getting to the
real answer. Each, though superficially more plausible than "He did it
because he's evil," is fundamentally no more satisfactory. The first is that
bin Laden did it to demonstrate the power, bravery, skill, and fanatical
resolve of his organization and thereby gain new recruits and allies. This
is undoubtedly true in a sense but far too vague. As just noted, the
overwhelming surface probability was that the attack would result in gravely
weakening and threatening al-Qaeda. That is certainly what the Bush
administration confidently promised. Why precisely did bin Laden expect,
against all probabilities, that the attack would eventually expand and
strengthen his organization and cause?

The second reply is that the 9/11 operation was intended as only one step in
a long campaign against the United States, a kind of dress rehearsal for
worse blows, perhaps with weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, biological,
or chemical. Once again, this argument makes no sense. If one intends to
start a long campaign to destroy the enemy, one does not begin with an
action that can be expected to galvanize rather than cripple the enemy and
make him more prepared to anticipate, prevent, and counter new attacks. It
would be as if Japan in 1941, having decided to fight the United States and
needing first of all to cripple American naval power in the Pacific, chose
to attack by bombing buildings in San Francisco and Los Angeles.

The only sensible answer, once the foolish and inadequate ones are
discarded, is that Osama bin Laden anticipated the American reaction and
wanted it. His purpose in attacking the United States directly in its
homeland was to get the American government to do what it had not done in
response to his previous attacks: to declare an all-out war against him and
al-Qaeda and a worldwide War on Terror led and organized by the United
States, with every other country in the world summoned to follow and support
or be considered an enemy. That seems to deepen the puzzle. Why thus
deliberately multiply the ranks of his enemies and organize their efforts
under the leadership of a single, powerful, aroused country?

The answer, if one thinks about it free from emotion and preoccupation with
oneself, is clear. Deliberately provoking the United States into open,
declared war against him, his forces, radical Islamism, and worldwide
terrorism was bin Laden's way of expanding a struggle he was already waging
but losing, one he could not win on account of its insoluble contradictions,
into a larger war free from internal contradictions that he could hope
ultimately to win. To put it in a nutshell, Osama bin Laden needed the
United States as a declared enemy to enable him to win his war against his
primary enemies and thus achieve his goals.

To understand this, we need once again to take bin Laden's fanatical
ideology and his hatred for the United States and the West for granted and
concentrate on his situation and the purposive rationality behind his
tactics. Consider his central goal-a Muslim world ruled by true Islamic law
and teaching, purged of all evil, materialist, secular, infidel, and
heretical influences. Of course he regards the West, especially the United
States, as the source of many of the evils corrupting and oppressing Islam
and would like ideally to destroy it, but the immediate obstacles to
achieving his vision and the main foes to be overcome have always lain
within the Muslim world itself. (There is a good parallel here with
16th-century Europe. The Ottoman Turks were the great military and religious
threat to Christendom, but the most bitter quarrels and wars were between
Christians of different creeds, churches, rulers, and countries.) The
obstacles he faced consisted of the divisions in sects, beliefs, and world
visions within Islam; hostile governments ruling in Islamic countries,
virtually all of whom regarded his kind of Islamic radicalism as a threat to
their rule and were determined to repress it; and the attitude of most
Muslims, loyal to their creed but unwilling to sacrifice what security and
well-being they had in his kind of jihad. Osama bin Laden tried to overcome
these obstacles and foes directly but the struggle, besides being difficult,
dangerous, and largely unsuccessful, was inherently divisive and
counterproductive. It meant pitting Muslim against Muslim, alienating more
followers and potential recruits to the movement than it attracted, and
giving free rein to the spread within Islam of infidel influences from
outside while Muslims fought each other.

There was, however, one good way to overcome these obstacles-that is, to
unite Muslims of divergent beliefs, sects, and visions against a single foe;
to discredit, paralyze, and possibly overthrow secular Muslim governments;
and to galvanize more believers into that suicidal zeal that al-Qaeda and
its kindred organizations need as a baby needs its mother's milk. That way
was to make the United States, already the Great Satan in much of the Muslim
world for a variety of reasons-its support of Israel against the
Palestinians, its support of corrupt dictatorships and secular regimes, its
encouragement of Iraq's war against Iran and toleration of Saddam Hussein's
atrocities, its later conquest, humiliation, and ongoing punishment of the
Iraqi people through sanctions, its long record of imperialism, its greed
for Arab oil, its military occupation of sacred Muslim soil, its penetration
of Muslim societies with its decadent culture and values-declare open war on
him and his followers united in a true, heroic Islamic resistance movement.

The solution, further, was if possible to provoke the U.S. into actually
attacking Muslim countries, using its awesome weapons against pitifully
outmatched Muslim forces, destroying and humiliating them, killing and
wounding civilians and destroying much property, occupying more Muslim land,
and miring itself in an attempt to control what it had conquered and to
impose its secular values and institutions on Arab and Muslim societies.
From this would arise the chance to demonstrate that faithful Muslims under
leaders and movements like bin Laden and al-Qaeda could be David to
America's Goliath. If they could not immediately slay the oppressor, they
could survive its onslaught, grow and spread despite it, and gradually
reduce it to a helpless giant, isolated from its former friends, trapped in
an interminable occupation of hostile territory and peoples, with its armed
forces stretched thin and its awesome weapons unusable, while al-Qaeda and
similar groups could continue to launch even bolder attacks against it or
anyone still associated with it.

That, I believe, is a reasonable rendition of Osama bin Laden's hopes and
strategy. It was a tremendous gamble, of course, and he could not possibly
have predicted exactly how it would turn out. But it is beyond doubt that
his gamble succeeded, that for more than three years after 9/11 things have
generally been going his way, and that he could not have achieved this huge,
improbable victory without indispensable American help. In declaring and
waging a War on Terror with al-Qaeda as its initial announced focus and the
United States as its self-acclaimed World Leader, America gave bin Laden
precisely the war he needed and wanted.

One can anticipate at least three reactions to this conclusion (three that
are printable, that is). Starting with the least important, they are:

1. This is all hindsight, Monday- morning quarterbacking.

2. Given the circumstances, there was nothing else the United States could
have done.

3. Even if this is all true, it is water under the bridge, useless in
deciding what to do now.

The first is easy to answer. Hindsight is a good exercise in politics,
especially for the public at election time-but this is not that. Quite a few
observers warned about these dangers at the time, and I was among them. In
an article written just after 9/11 and published in November 2001 ("The
Risks of Victory," The National Interest, Winter 2001/2002) I argued, among
other things, against allowing a necessary and justified military campaign
in Afghanistan to draw us into leading a general War on Terror in the wider
Middle East and the world. More warnings were included in my "Iraq: The Case
Against Preventive War," appearing in this journal in October 2002. Mine was
only one voice in a steady, growing chorus, though one always drowned out by
crowds of raucous hawks.

The second objection has a little more substance. Certainly 9/11 required
strong action including military measures against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan,
and the natural, inevitable war psychology pervading the country had to be
reckoned with. Yet as was pointed out earlier, these needs required actions
like those taken initially more than words. As far as the public rhetoric
and justification was concerned, nothing hindered the administration from
conceiving and explaining the undertaking differently both to the American
public and the world, especially the Arab-Muslim world that was Osama bin
Laden's real target.

There is little point now in drafting the kind of address Bush should have
delivered to Congress and the public. But one can readily imagine an
American president (though not Bush) persuasively making the two cardinal
points. First, the United States intended to pursue al-Qaeda with all the
weapons at its command on grounds of legitimate self-defense and, while
respecting the rights of other countries, would allow no one to interfere
with these actions. It would not, however, dignify al-Qaeda's atrocious
crimes by calling them acts of war or give Osama bin Laden and his fellow
criminals what they obviously wanted, a pretext to portray themselves as
soldiers in a holy war against the United States. Instead, it would pursue
them ruthlessly the way civilized nations had always pursued criminal
organizations, as international outlaws and pirates, enemies of all
governments and of civilization itself, and it expected other countries to
co-operate in this struggle.

Second, the United States recognized that though it was the direct target of
this attack and that in one sense it represented al-Qaeda's final enemy and
target, it was not the country most menaced by the current threat from
al-Qaeda and international terrorism generally. As bin Laden well knew,
neither this attack nor possible future ones, tragic though the individual
deaths and losses were, could really hurt the United States, much less deter
it from its purpose of hunting down the criminals behind the atrocities. The
attack instead had already had just the opposite effect. It had strengthened
the country and united Americans and their friends throughout the world for
a long struggle against him and his fellow terrorist criminals. America's
government, institutions, and civil society were rock solid. It had no
homegrown terrorist organizations to fear or ethnic and religious
differences for terrorists to exploit. Its relatively small Muslim
population was well integrated and overwhelmingly loyal to the United
States, thankful for its blessings and freedoms.

Many other countries in the world could not say this, especially the Arab
and Muslim countries that Osama bin Laden wanted to subvert and
revolutionize as he had already done in Afghanistan. These countries and
governments had the most to fear from al-Qaeda and international terrorism;
they and not the United States were the real targets of the 9/11 attack.
Even America's European allies and friends, sound though their countries and
institutions were for the most part, had more to fear directly from
terrorism than the United States, given their large unassimilated Muslim
populations and their proximity to the Middle East. The United States was,
of course, vitally concerned with the general problem of international
terrorism. It had interests around the world to protect, including those in
the Middle East and other threatened regions. Nonetheless, this was not
first and foremost America's problem, nor was it America's place primarily
to provide the solution. The terrorists wanted to make the United States
appear an imperialist Great Satan imposing its will and its solutions on
others and forcing them to follow its lead. America would not fall into that
trap. The U.S. had a particular right and duty to its citizens and the world
to pursue al-Qaeda and exterminate it as a criminal organization. It would
help, advise, support, and even where specifically desired lead others in
the global struggle against terrorism. But it would not try to force others
who had an even greater and more immediate stake in that struggle to do what
their own self-interest ought to compel them to do, nor would it try to
dictate the kinds of internal measures and reforms they needed to take to
combat the common enemy.

That kind of language would have done everything language can do both to
free the United States to attack al-Qaeda and to put pressure on other
governments, especially in the Middle East, to confront their own problems
and responsibilities and seek help if necessary from the United States,
rather than hiding behind it. It also would have undercut the al-Qaeda
strategy of making the United States into the main enemy, helped place
responsibilities where they belonged, and galvanized genuine world support
in the struggle against terrorism. What is more, it would have been entirely
consistent with the campaign against terrorism the United States actually
waged at the outset. That was very much an international effort, a largely
proxy war directed but not mainly fought by the U.S. and focused strictly on
destroying al-Qaeda's organization and governmental base-until this focus
was foolishly abandoned to attack Iraq.

To heighten the irony, this kind of language would have conformed to the
actual wartime policies the administration has followed. Let us be honest:
the "War on Terror" in America is basically a sham, a charade. While great,
even ultimate sacrifices have been demanded of relatively few, chiefly those
in the armed forces, for the overwhelming majority of Americans having the
country at war has meant massive tax cuts, exhortations to spend and
consume, enormous deficits, politics and government spending as usual-in
short, no wartime sacrifice at all. The rest of the world knows this and
sees the hypocrisy, if we do not.

As for the last reply, that this argument now represents water under the
bridge, useless for current or future policy, if that were true, it would
constitute the most devastating indictment of the Bush strategy possible. It
would mean that the administration had so ruined America's position that
nothing could now remedy it. But it is not true. This administration's
policy deserves harsh condemnation for the reckless incompetence that has
made the way out now much more painful and costly, but a way out still lies
in recognizing that the United States needs to abandon not the struggle
against international terrorism but the conception of that struggle as a war
fought and led mainly by the United States, making itself the chief target
of the enemy.

This is a change only a new administration could make, though obviously not
during the electoral campaign, when it would be suicidal. Once in office,
however, it could claim that it had found things to be even worse than it
knew and could make the kind of 180-degree turn Bush executed after his
election. A gradual disengagement from Iraq and re-concentration on
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the pursuit of al-Qaeda, a devolution of tasks
onto the UN and NATO on the grounds that even the best meant efforts of the
United States are frustrated by the fact that it is seen as the enemy by too
many in the region, a willingness to admit past mistakes and agree to focus
co-operatively on other problems as well-all this would become possible,
though not easy, if only the current American war mentality and psyche gave
way to a saner one. This still could happen-but of course not under Bush.
____________________________________________________

Paul W. Schroeder is professor emeritus of history at the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champagne. His most recent book is Systems, Stability and
Statecraft: Essays in the International History of Modern Europe.

October 25, 2004 issue
Copyright C 2004 The American Conservative”

“Hey, where can I buy this book? :^D”

“If you can spare 15 minutes, it's a good read from the perspective of a conservative professor of history.”

“For some reason I just don't believe you V.”

“I don't recommend you read it, Nigal.

It's too hard.”

“It's posted by Violin. Therefor it must be a lie.”

“No, I posted it, and it was written by Paul W. Schroeder.

But have a nice day anyway.”

“Ah it was Vio-liar that started the thread. my bad. I will read it then.”

“Source URL: http://www.amconmag.com/2004_10_25/feature.html”

“I think Nigal is asking for the version with the big pictures.”

“I figured this might not get the total read and grok treatment because it's so long, so here's a bit of the relevent portion, IMO:



...especially the Arab
and Muslim countries that Osama bin Laden wanted to subvert and
revolutionize as he had already done in Afghanistan. These countries and
governments had the most to fear from al-Qaeda and international terrorism;
they and not the United States were the real targets of the 9/11 attack.
Even America's European allies and friends, sound though their countries and
institutions were for the most part, had more to fear directly from
terrorism than the United States, given their large unassimilated Muslim
populations and their proximity to the Middle East. The United States was,
of course, vitally concerned with the general problem of international
terrorism. It had interests around the world to protect, including those in
the Middle East and other threatened regions. Nonetheless, this was not
first and foremost America's problem, nor was it America's place primarily
to provide the solution. The terrorists wanted to make the United States
appear an imperialist Great Satan imposing its will and its solutions on
others and forcing them to follow its lead. America would not fall into that
trap. The U.S. had a particular right and duty to its citizens and the world
to pursue al-Qaeda and exterminate it as a criminal organization. It would
help, advise, support, and even where specifically desired lead others in
the global struggle against terrorism. But it would not try to force others
who had an even greater and more immediate stake in that struggle to do what
their own self-interest ought to compel them to do, nor would it try to
dictate the kinds of internal measures and reforms they needed to take to
combat the common enemy.

That kind of language would have done everything language can do both to
free the United States to attack al-Qaeda and to put pressure on other
governments, especially in the Middle East, to confront their own problems
and responsibilities and seek help if necessary from the United States,
rather than hiding behind it. It also would have undercut the al-Qaeda
strategy of making the United States into the main enemy, helped place
responsibilities where they belonged, and galvanized genuine world support
in the struggle against terrorism. What is more, it would have been entirely
consistent with the campaign against terrorism the United States actually
waged at the outset. That was very much an international effort, a largely
proxy war directed but not mainly fought by the U.S. and focused strictly on
destroying al-Qaeda's organization and governmental base-until this focus
was foolishly abandoned to attack Iraq.”

“An interesting read. It encompasses many arguments we've posited on this board. Invading Iraq has strengthened, not weakened, Al Qaeda. But that idea seems lost on the American Taliban, who view our actions in overly simplistic terms. Invade them all and let God sort them out!”

“I was planning on posting a backhanded endorsement of Kerry from that magazine on the 'Republicans for Kerry' thread. Thanks for posting this Phaed, but like Geo said, it�s the same argument many here have made for several years, just in a lot more words. Incidentally, Pat Buchanan is an editor at The American Conservative, and has been making this argument all along. I'm much more comfortable with intellectually honest traditional conservatives than I am with the neocon cabal that has taken over our government.”

“Wow - nice comical piece. Thanks for posting. It's interesting that somebody can be right on so much of the premise and completely bass ackwards on the conclusion. And to do it humorously with all the "without emotion and with reason" bullcrud. A real talent!

His first dumbass remark was this:

A revolutionary or terrorist movement has much to
gain from getting a real government to declare war upon it. This gives the
movement considerable status, putting it in some sense in the same league
with the government with which it is now recognized as at war.

Oh right, like a massive, coordinated, sophisticated, simultaneous attack on some of the most visible American targets didn't give AQ all the stature they seeked.

But really that's minor compared to his major mistake:

But it is beyond doubt that
his gamble succeeded, that for more than three years after 9/11 things have
generally been going his way,

No, they haven't. He more or less correctly identifies the reasons AQ attacked America. But how he arrives at this conclusion is puzzling. First, the U.S. didn't launch simultaneous military operations against multiple ME countries, as OBL specifically stated as his desire. The U.S. correctly attacked afghanistan. The major fighting was basically over before it attacked Iraq. Regardless whether Iraq was right or wrong, this is NOT what OBL had in mind. He wanted a severe over-reaction - an simultaneous attack on multiple fronts. It simply didn't happen. OBL wanted the Arab Street to rise up and overthrow their secular despotic governments. That didn't happen either. Nor has their been any demonstrable growth of credible terrorist organizations with global reach. OBL *didn't* want increased cooperation between ME countries and the U.S. That *did* happen, in spades. OBL wanted to continue targeting the U.S. That didn't happen; OBL switched his focus to Saudi Arabia, when the Saudis started to cooperate with the U.S. OBL needed to show the Arab world that the U.S. counter-attack was survivable, so that the Arab Street might gain confidence in rising up. OBL has failed to launch another 9/11 scale attack - not even close to it has succeeded. OBL wanted the Shiites in Iraq to rise up and actively oppose the U.S. occupation. That didn't happen, either. Instead, the resistance has come from sunnis, foreign jihadists, some minor terrorists, and a few shiite nuts. And the American occupation shows little real signs of weakening, even after all its mistakes.

The point is, this guy is full of it, and is likely not conservative as advertised. The U.S. might be failing to win the WOT, but the war has definitely not gone well for OBL/AQ!

And of course, the usual suspects lap this claptrap up without any critical thinking....”

“Mutt, you should be fuller of yourself. Really.

AQ seems to have expanded its global reach, if you count the terrorist attacks in Russia and Spain as AQ. You talk often of "emboldening" the terrorists. Doesn't it seem like it's happened?

OBL has failed to launch another 9/11 scale attack - not even close to it has succeeded.

You keep repeating this. For years before 9/11, he was unable to do it. Face facts, 9/11 was a one-shot exception. America won't be caught unaware in that fashion again - and it has NOTHING to do with what our military is doing overseas.

Yes, it's important to keep WMD out of the hands of the madmen, but that's about as far as that argument goes.”

“AQ seems to have expanded its global reach, if you count the terrorist attacks in Russia and Spain as AQ

Questionable. Certainly some two-bit terrorist organizations with loose connections to AQ have taken advantage of the situation, but to equate this with the expansion of a credible, global reaching terrorist network is risible.

You talk often of "emboldening" the terrorists. Doesn't it seem like it's happened

No - OBL's gamble failed miserably, as I pointed out and you conveniently ignored. Now, has the rise in jihadist activity been the result of U.S. action? Yes, but this is not the threat we're fighting. Plus, movements like that are always temporary.

For years before 9/11, he was unable to do it.

Jezus, phaedrus, THINK! OBL only started to seriously put together AQ after Somalia. It takes time, secrecy, and money to establish the kind of serious conspiracy network that AQ was. I'd say they did pretty damn well at pulling off 9/11 as soon as they did. I don't think it's wise of you to underestimate the enemy like that. Plus, the fact that a credible terrorist network is exceedingly difficult and time-consuming to put together, refutes the Chicken Little refrain "the U.S. is only creating more terrorists". No, AQ has *never* been short of recruits. AQ can't field every illiterate Arab peasant that wants to join.

Ay, this is like talking to a brick wall. You only see what you want to see.”

“mutt seems to know a lot about building a terrorist operation. His admiration for the 9/11 operation is particularly revealing. I think matt should turn his IP address over to the FBI.”

“At leaste he never accussed ya of callin' him a honkey and is sticking to issues and not lies. Right?”

“LOL - Violin, are you going to let nigal get so much mileage outta this? Not that I mind, I find it hilarious!”

“Oh I'm getting 45 city and a whopping 65 highway outta this one. If I potentually only have 10 days left around here I'm gonna bleed Mr. Racebaiter for all he's worth. LOL!”

“WASHINGTON, Feb. 25 — Vice President Dick Cheney made an unannounced trip to Pakistan on Monday to deliver what officials in Washington described as an unusually tough message Gen. Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, warning him that the newly Democratic Congress could cut aid to his country unless his forces become far more aggressive in hunting down operatives with Al Qaeda.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/26/world/asia/26cnd-pakistan.html?em&ex=1172638800&en=5b50013ec0b00de0&ei=5087%0A”

“Even Cheney concedes that the Democrats are more serious about dismantling Al Qaeda.”

“Poor dim Vile has yet to figure out the concept of Fuego. LOL.”

“You got it, Violin!!

The Democrats could cut off the goose that lays the golden egg/military spending gravy train.”

“Even Cheney concedes that the Democrats are more serious about dismantling Al Qaeda. - violin

I think the actual meeting was postponed, was it not? Anyway, your take on it is of course completely off, but then you're just being bitter. Here's what this really means: Bush needs Musharraf in the Spring to mount operations in Tribal Pakistan. Musharraf needs incentive, and neither Bush nor the Dems want a failure on his part to follow through. This is classic carrot/stick diplomacy. It's so simple MarkO ought to be able to grasp it. Then again, he's ranting about his military-industrial conspiracies again. Must have laid off the meds this weekend. Or maybe taking drugs is what did it! LOL”

“Conspiracies??

No......contracts.”

“I thought it was Wall Street? LOL - that was one of your classics.”

“Given your track record, mutt, I don't think I'll give your interpretation much weight.”

“Oh, I see, violin. Instead we're supposed to believe that Cheney is going to tell Musharref that the Democrats are "more serious" about AQ than Bush. Jeezus you can be blazingly childish at times. I know you're still stinging from all the rebukes I've given you in the past few years, so instead of listening to me, listen to the media:

The Bush administration is pressing Musharraf – a key Washington ally in the war on terrorism – to do more to disrupt Pakistan-based Taliban fighters and hunt down al-Qaeda operatives suspected of hiding in tribal areas near the border. It has raised the possibility that Congress could cut aid to Pakistan unless tougher steps are taken.

Gee whiz, and just in time for the expected Spring Offensive! Whoda thunk!”

“I do think it's very cute the way Vile can make these statements with a straight face, LOL.”

“$10 bucks says violin won't bother to respond to my blatant refutation of his point. Owned!”

“I thought Phaedrus provided a pretty good summary of all the things you were wrong about - like pretty much everything - but if you're really in the mood for more ridicule...”

“Does Cheney have the appearance of a constrictor looking at his lunch in that pic? Or like a ten-year-old looking at a piece of chocolate birthday cake... only more reptilian?

His media consultants should really tell him to NOT try to smile for these photo ops.”

“LOL
The great thing about Cheney is how he scares all the nutroots and makes them pee their panties just from looking at him.”

“Looks like I goaded violin back in - the childish are so easily manipulated!

Of course, with no substantive remarks, violin remains OWNED!

Man, as lame as it is, Trail Talk can be so....satisfying sometimes. Thanks, violin!”

“Is "owned" some gay bondage term? I'm not passing judgement on your lifestyle, I'm just not familiar with your world, mutt.”

“The gay slurs so soon?
Vile is slipping.
Usually they come far into a thread after it's clear to all Vile is full of it, LOL.”

““Poor dim Vile has yet to figure out the concept of Fuego. LOL.”
StoveStomper

You'd think even a dim NetNanny would at least be able to figure out that a thread started in March 2004 was started before the Fuego heading was instituted.”

“LOL
Add Geo to that can not understand the concept of Fuego list.”

“Jeez, I know this must be hard for you to comprehend (that means figure out), but the thread was started before there was a Fuego heading.

No wonder you're always at odds with people who can read.”

“Add Geo twice to that can not understand the concept of Fuego list.
LOL”

“LOL..I think Viole has taken on the position of selling the BIG TICKET item of the Liberal Dems....

FAILURE in FORIEGN POLICY - A Democratic hallmark since 1972.”